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Abstract
The simplifying assumption of rational self-interest is a common one in 
the social sciences, however it may not always be entirely realistic. People can 
also adopt a variety of alternative social preferences that place weight on both 
private and group outcomes. Using experimental methods from economics and 
psychology, this paper empirically estimates these different “social value 
orientations” (SVOs), ranging continuously from relatively proself social 
preferences (competition and individualism) to relatively prosocial (altruism and 
cooperation). This measure is then applied to a common-pool resource (CPR) 
experiment to test if social preferences can be used to predict strategic harvesting 
decisions or participation in a peer-enforced regulatory institution. I find that 
perfect self-interest is one of many consistent forms of social preference, and that 
prosocial (proself) preferences successfully predict lower (higher) rates of 
resource extraction. Social preferences can also be used to predict regulatory 
participation, but the long-run relationship is less clear.
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Introduction
Common-pool resource (CPR) theory provides us with valuable insight 
into some of the world's most complex and pressing environmental problems. To 
make sense out of why endangered species are hunted to extinction, tropical 
rainforests become clear-cut, or oceans are drained of fish, one needs to 
understand not just the man-made rules that govern our shared natural resources, 
but also the unique incentives and social preferences of people in the global 
commons. Great strides have been made in deconstructing the determinants of 
group cooperation in CPR dilemmas over the last twenty years. Many of these 
developments have focused on various institutional factors that promote the 
efficient and sustainable harvest of common pool goods. More recently, there has 
been a great deal of interest in how individual-level behavioral differences also 
factor into resource allocation decisions (Stoop et al., 2013; Van Soest & 
Vyrastekova, 2006). There has also been a related interest in whether these 
behavioral heterogeneities can result in non-uniform responses to institutional 
treatments (Moeltner et al., 2013).
While no doubt a useful starting point for modeling behavior, the common 
simplifying assumption of perfectly rational resource users, interested solely in 
the maximization of their private rents, has been criticized as unrealistic and not 
universally applicable to all economic decision makers (Levitt & List, 2008). 
Differences in “social value orientations” (SVOs), which describe the weighting 
1
people place on their own material outcomes relative to the outcomes of others, 
have been proposed as one way of extending the traditional behavioral framework
of rational choice theory to incorporate important “other-regarding” preferences 
(Kopelman et al., 2002). The extent to which the perceived welfare of others 
influences behavior in a CPR dilemma may potentially be just as important for 
understanding decision making as the institutional regime under which choices 
are made.
Using experimental methods from economics and psychology, this paper 
attempts to answer three main questions regarding the intersection of these 
preferences and the social dilemmas related to CPRs. Firstly, how well does the 
theoretical ideal of rational self-interest actually describe the social preferences 
people possess? Many resource users no doubt adopt a so-called “individualistic” 
orientation and only consider their private benefits as standard rational choice 
theory predicts. However this is just one of many possibilities from a wide range 
of potential SVOs. It may be more reasonable to assume a heterogeneous mixture 
of both individualistic preferences and other-regarding preferences such as 
altruism, joint-maximization or competition.
Secondly, if differences in social preferences can be distinguished, can 
they also be used to predict extraction behavior under the normal strategic 
conditions of a CPR dilemma? Information on an individual's professed social 
values are of little use to economists or environmental policy makers unless those 
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values can also be used to predict systematic disparities in the harvest strategies of
users with different preferences. Having a way to measure group composition in 
terms of SVO, along with any associated variations in expected extraction rates 
could be a valuable information input. 
Lastly, if SVO can be used as an a priori predictor of extraction behavior, 
can it also be used to predict differing responses to institutional treatments? 
Group-enforced regulations in the form of monetary sanctions are a standard tool 
to increase gross efficiency in CPR experiments (Ostrom et al. 1992). If SVOs 
can be used to predict participation in peer-sanctioning activities, then information
on this institutional heterogeneity could also be of great use when designing 
experimental treatments, or even real-world instruments aimed at discouraging 
resource exploitation.
In order to answer these questions, a series of economic experiments were 
conducted to empirically estimate differences in social preferences, and test 
whether these qualities are a valid predictor of certain behaviors in CPR 
dilemmas. While this is far from the first attempt in the literature, this paper 
makes a few modest contributions to the existing body of experimental research. 
First, compared to other social traps modeled using public goods games or one-
shot prisoner's dilemmas, the influence of SVO on repeated, n-person CPR games
has received comparatively little attention (Balliet et al., 2009). This is 
unfortunate given that many natural resources have common-pool properties, and 
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ensuring the sustainable use of these goods is key to many relevant environmental
problems. 
Second, many prior attempts to link SVO and social dilemma behavior 
have employed relatively basic categorical measurement methods (Brosig, 2002; 
Van Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006). I adopt a more modern and sophisticated 
estimation technique recently developed by Murphy et al. (2011) known as the 
“SVO Slider Method”. This method produces a ranked and transitive measure of 
SVO over a continuous spectrum ranging from relatively proself social 
preferences (competition and individualism) to relatively prosocial (cooperation 
and altruism). Treatment of SVO as a continuum is more consistent with the 
concept's theoretical origins, allows for more accurate descriptions of social 
preferences, and provides an efficient econometric tool for determining any effect 
on strategic behaviors. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: first I begin with 
some of the obligatory background information on the nature of CPR dilemmas, 
as well as a review of the theoretical framework for social preferences. This is 
followed by an explanation of how preferences are estimated using the SVO 
Slider Method, as well as the model used to simulate the CPR dilemma 
experimentally. After a description of the experimental protocol, I outline some 
testable hypotheses. Finally I discuss the results of the experiment. I conclude 
with a review of my findings, and ideas for further research avenues.
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Background
Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas:
The efficient long-run use of shared natural resources is frequently 
undermined by the “subtractable” (rivalrous) and “non-excludable” nature of 
common-pool goods (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 7). When the costs associated with 
regulating access to a resource stock are prohibitively high, it is considered 
functionally “non-excludable”. Given that barriers to entry and exit are trivial or 
non-existent, anyone is free to enter the commons, extract the shared resource, 
and exit once the stock's profitability has been depleted. This is often the case 
with natural resources that are diffuse, and flow between man-made borders (fresh
water sources, migratory animals, etc.), or are contained within large areas that 
make traditional monitoring and regulation impractical (fisheries, timber lands, 
etc.). When these resources are also “subtractable” (rivalrous), each unit 
consumed tends to reduce the aggregate level of the resource stock by a 
proportional amount. Any goods extracted by one user are thus unavailable to be 
consumed by another user, or to be consumed at some later date. 
Since the easiest way to extend property rights over common pool goods is
through the destructive process of extraction and consumption, the predicted 
strategy for a rational, perfectly self-interested resource user is to extract as fast as
possible before any rivals have a chance to do the same. This results in a social 
dilemma where no individual resource user has an incentive to moderate their 
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consumption of the good while the consumption strategies of other users remains 
unchanged. Marginal benefits accrue directly to the individual, while marginal 
costs are largely externalized amongst the group. Barring some form of external 
or internal regulatory institution, CPRs tend to be over-exploited, and in extreme 
cases exhausted entirely. This “rent dissipation”, ultimately results in net 
deadweight loss to society (Walker et al., 1990).
Economic descriptions of CPR dilemmas date at least as far back as the 
early 19th century when British political economist William F. Lloyd first 
documented the overgrazing that plagued much of Europe’s communally held 
pastoral lands (1833). In the 1950s the general problem was formalized 
mathematically in the pioneering fisheries models of Gordon (1954) and Scott 
(1955). However, it was not until 1968, and the publication of ecologist Garret 
Hardin's seminal essay on “The Tragedy of the Commons”, that the problem was 
truly popularized, and began receiving broader attention from social scientists.
Hardin’s influential analysis left little room for optimism. Drawing on 
Lloyd’s earlier study of herdsman behavior, Hardin argued that the “rational” CPR
user, concerned only with their own myopic gain, would invariably over-exploit 
and destroy shared natural resource stocks. “Ruin”, he declared, “is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons” (p. 1244).
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It was assumed that unless people were bound by social arrangements of 
“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected”, 
over-exploitation of the commons was all but inevitable (p. 1247). Hardin 
conceded that well-defined property rights, whether held by the state in a socialist 
system or by private parties in market economies, could potentially prevent 
resource degradation. However he also professed skepticism that formal property 
rights would be feasible in many instances. He ultimately believed that in most 
instances the Tragedy of the Commons was simply beyond “technical solution”, 
and instead required a more radical “fundamental extension in morality” in order 
to prevent ecological collapse (p. 1243).
This dismal narrative – in which uniformly rational and self-interested 
resource users find themselves in an inextricable social trap, that is doomed to end
in tragedy – became conventional wisdom on the subject for many years (Feeney 
et al., 1996). However, beginning chiefly in the early 1990s, a large body of 
evidence has since developed in contrast to Hardin's mutually assured destruction 
(Ostrom et al., 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom & Walker, 1991). Studies based 
on both field evidence and experimental replication have found numerous 
instances where the Tragedy of the Commons fails to materialize under the 
conditions one would normally expect (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009). While CPR 
dilemmas frequently do end in tragedy, it is now widely acknowledged that this 
outcome need not be considered a foregone conclusion. Under proper conditions, 
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individuals tend to develop formal and informal institutional arrangements to 
solve open-access problems and overcome social dilemmas (North, 1990). While 
formal property rights are costly to establish, informal institutions such as social 
pressure, or ostracism can also be an effective and complementary tool to induce 
group cooperation. Worst case scenarios like the Tragedy of the Commons are 
most likely to occur only when certain conditions are met with respect to the 
resource and its users; namely “when resource users are totally anonymous, do 
not have a foundation of trust and reciprocity, cannot communicate, and have no 
established rules” regarding extraction (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009, p. 255). 
While the institutional dimensions of the CPR dilemma have received a  
great deal of attention already, recently more interest has been directed at how 
“asymmetries” in resource harvest can also be attributed to behavioral 
heterogeneities among users (Jacquet et al., 2013). While Hardin based his 
arguments on the expected behavior of perfectly rational and self-interested 
individuals, recent avenues of research have attempted to incorporate the 
possibility of other SVOs to see how preferences regarding trust, reciprocity, 
altruism, equity, cooperation or competition manifest in different extraction 
patterns between otherwise identical users (Ostrom, 1998; Stoop et al., 2013; Van 
Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006). 
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Social Value Orientations:
While the terminology adopted here has its roots in behavioral economics 
and psychology, the concept of social value orientations is one that is inter-
disciplinary and should be familiar to most social scientists by one name or 
another. Generally speaking, an individual's SVO refers to the intrinsic social 
preferences that underlie their decision making under conditions of mutual 
interdependence. More specifically, these orientations describe the weighting 
individuals place on their own material outcomes relative to the outcomes of 
others. This postulates that an individual's utility can be a function not just of their
own material payoffs, πi , but also the payoffs of others, π j≠i . This gives 
decision makers a general utility function of the form, U i= f (πi ,π j≠i) . The 
precise functional form, as well as the sign and magnitude of each argument are 
what ultimately define a decision maker's SVO. This concept has also been 
referred to as “other-regarding preferences”, “welfare tradeoff ratios”, “collective 
interest”, “social utility”, or a plethora of other terms depending on the field of 
behavioral science being surveyed. 
This wide variety of discipline-specific jargon for what is ultimately a 
singular concept speaks to the shared interest of economists, psychologists, 
political scientists, and other researchers in accounting for how individuals 
behave when their choices have material consequences on the welfare of others. 
Within economics specifically, the idea that subjective utility can be a function 
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not just of an individual decision maker's outcome, but also the outcomes (or at 
least the perceived outcomes) of others, is not a new or particularly novel idea. 
The notion is at least as old as the field itself, with practitioners as far back as 
Adam Smith indirectly acknowledging the importance of SVOs. In The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759) Smith made explicit his belief that “How selfish soever 
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles of his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (p. 1). 
While there are a potentially infinite range of internally consistent SVOs a 
decision maker might theoretically adopt, the vast majority of people in economic
and social dilemma contexts have historically been classified into one of four 
idealized categories: competitive, individualistic, cooperative or altruistic 
(McClintock, 1972). Cooperative and altruistic preferences are generally referred 
to as “prosocial” motivations, while competitive and individualistic preferences 
are deemed “proself” (Kopelman et al., 2002, p. 118). These idealized SVO types,
as well as many others, are often illustrated using the “SVO Ring” framework 
shown in Figure 1 (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014, p. 16).
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Originally presented by Liebrand (1984), the SVO Ring is a graphical 
representation of how individuals weigh their own material outcomes relative to 
the outcomes of others. Payoffs that decision makers assign to themselves are 
shown on the horizontal axis, while payoffs assigned to others are shown on the 
vertical axis. Points within the 360 degree circle represent all possible joint 
outcomes, while each cardinal direction along the outside of the circle represent 
different idealized SVO categories. The four most common SVOs of interest to 
economists are concentrated on the right hand side of the ring.
Decision makers who tend to prefer joint outcomes that maximize their 
own payoffs, and do not concern themselves with how this allocation effects the 
11
Figure 1: The SVO Ring
payoffs of others, are defined as “individualistic”. This SVO is equivalent to the 
theoretical ideal of self-interest commonly assumed by rational choice theory. In 
utilitarian terms, the only argument in a perfectly individualistic decision maker's 
utility function is assumed to be their own payoffs, while the payoffs of others do 
not factor into their internal calculus. This is shown by the farthest right, zero 
degree point along the SVO Ring (the 100/50 self-other point split).
In contrast, decision makers who tend to prefer distributions that maximize
joint payoffs, and are thus sensitive to the gains or losses of others, are typically 
defined as “cooperative”. Perfectly cooperative decision makers maximize their 
utility by choosing distributions that maximize aggregate group payoffs, even if it 
entails accepting a lower private share. This is shown by the 45 degree point along
the SVO Ring (the 85/85 self-other point split). Note that this SVO is sometimes 
also referred to simply as “prosocial”, as in the figure above. This is because 
within the cooperative category there is also a related prosocial preference 
regarding equity. The 45 degree point where joint payoffs are maximized also 
happens to be the same one where differences between payoffs are minimized. 
Therefore cooperation can refer to either joint maximization or inequality 
minimization. The difference between inequality averse and inequality tolerant 
forms of cooperation is an important distinction, as we will see later.
Although less common, “altruistic” and “competitive” social preferences 
are also observed in many circumstances. These two SVOs represent relatively 
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extreme forms of prosocial and proself behavior respectively. Decision makers 
with perfectly altruistic preferences are assumed to prefer joint distributions that 
maximize the payoffs of others, while disregarding their own. This orientation is 
shown by the 90 degree point along the SVO Ring (the 50/100 self-other point 
split). 
Conversely, competitive preferences concern the relative distribution of 
earnings. Decision makers who possess perfectly competitive preferences are 
assumed to derive utility by maximizing the distance between their payoff and 
those of others. This orientation is less concerned with the absolute value of  any 
rents, and more interested in maintaining a relative advantage over others. This is 
shown by the -45 degree point along the SVO Ring (the 85/15 self-other point 
split). 
Because utility is a purely theoretical construct which obviously cannot be 
directly measured, information on the social preferences an individual possesses 
must be inferred through other means. The most commonly accepted method in 
behavioral economics and psychology is the use of “decomposed games”, a 
revealed preference technique first developed by Messick & McClintock (1968). 
Although similar to the “dictator games” more common in pure economics 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994), the decomposed game is actually a
more general test of social preferences, and may contain dictator games nested 
within (Murphy et al., 2011, p. 779).
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In a decomposed game, subjects are presented with a series of joint 
distribution items that require them to unilaterally assign different payoffs to 
themselves and another anonymous participant One subject is assigned the role of 
the “sender” while the other acts as a passive “receiver”. This distinguishes the 
task from “composed” games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where all players 
have a strategic input on the outcome. Senders never learn who their choices 
ultimately impact, and receivers never learn the identity of the person making the 
decision. Because all choices are unilateral, independent and anonymous, and 
there are no opportunities for reciprocation or retaliation, strategic behavior 
theoretically does not enter into the decision-making process. This gives a clearer 
picture of the intrinsic distributional preferences subject's possess, free of 
confounding sub-games where decisions must be interpreted based on 
expectations of another player's response. 
For example, consider a decision maker offered a simple one-shot, binary 
choice between two different distributions of currency, allocated between 
themselves, and some other anonymous individual. The joint distribution options 
for this choice are shown in Table 1 (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014, p. 34).
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Table 1: Decomposed Game Example
Option A Option B
You receive $150
Other person receives $50
You receive $85
Other person receives $85
If one assumes that the decision maker derives utility solely from their 
own payoff, and thus ignores the payoff of the other person, the utility 
maximizing decision will be the “individualistic” Option A. However, suppose the
individual would derive more utility from ensuring that joint payoffs were 
maximized, even at the pecuniary cost of a lower payoff to themselves. In this 
case we would expect them to choose the “cooperative” Option B instead. 
Although both decisions are technically rational in the eyes of the decision maker,
and neither is inconsistent with the principles of utility maximization, traditionally
only Option A has been considered compatible with rational choice theory. 
Obviously this example is heavily simplified, and is of little use other than
to illustrate the general idea of the decomposed games technique. A wide variety 
of specific methods have been developed to estimate social preferences, each with
its relative costs and benefits with respect to factors like item presentation, 
accuracy, decision consistency, the range of SVOs accounted for, statistical 
efficiency, etc. A comprehensive review of these methods is outside the scope of 
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this paper,1 but the two most commonly accepted approaches currently include the
“Triple Dominance Scale” (Van Lange et al., 1997), and the “Ring Measure” 
(Brosig, 2002; Van Soest & Vyrastekova, 2006).The Triple Dominance Scale 
typically consists of nine multiple choice items that require decision makers to 
choose from joint distributions that represent various idealized SVO types. 
Whatever orientation “dominates” on average, is the preference they are assigned.
The Ring Measure on the other hand employs a simple series of binary choice 
items to make a similar inference. 
While these methods both have their advantages, they are limited by a 
number of common factors. Firstly, both measures ultimately reduce social 
preferences (an inherently continuous construct) to discrete categorical outputs 
based on idealized SVO types. This entails a significant sacrifice of statistical 
power and the loss of valuable information about preferences on the margins of 
each category. This problem can be compounded when preferences are further 
reduced simply to the proself and prosocial dichotomy (see Cohen, 1983), which 
is especially common with respect to the Triple Dominance Scale (Murphy and 
Ackermann, 2014, p. 33). It is preferable to have a measure that captures the 
relative intensity of proself and prosocial preferences as a ranked, and transitive 
continuum, rather than a discrete either-or category. Social preferences represent 
relative weights applied to different joint-outcomes, therefore continuous 
1 See Murphy & Ackermann (2014) for a summary.
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measurement is more consistent with the concept's theoretical origins (Griesinger 
& Livingston, 1973).
Secondly, neither measure adequately distinguish between decision makers
that identify as cooperative due to an actual desire to maximize joint-payoffs, or 
because this joint distribution on the SVO Ring also happens to be one that tends 
to minimize inequality. While both forms of social preference lie along the 
prosocial range of the SVO Ring, and would be illustrated by the same 45 degree 
point, they are actually two very different cooperative motivations. This issue has 
largely been overlooked by prior studies. Failing to to account for the distinction 
in different forms of nominally cooperative preferences can result in the 
appearance of decision inconsistency (decision makers seemingly making choices
at random) when the Ring Measure is applied (Ibid, p. 29). Sufficiently high 
levels of this apparent inconsistency can result in subjects being miscategorized or
even erroneously excluded from a sample. This leads to potentially biased 
estimates of group composition, with certain SVOs (particularly on the prosocial 
end of the spectrum) being misrepresented in the sample. Van Soest & 
Vyrastekova (2006) for example, report unusually high proportions of proself 
orientations (82%) in their subject pool when employing a 24 item version of the 
Ring Measure, with decision consistency ranging anywhere from 72% to 92% 
(pp. 124-125).
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Ideally, measures of social preference should be general enough to 
incorporate a wide range of prosocial and proself SVOs. They should also provide
a ranked and transitive ordering of those preferences that is consistent with the 
continuous nature of SVO theory. Lastly decisions should be internally consistent,
and properly distinguish between cooperative behavior motivated by the desire to 
maximize joint payoffs, or by the desire to minimize inequality. Given the diverse 
range of social preferences individuals can potentially adopt, and the need for a 
measure that can efficiently account for them, I now turn to my preferred 
estimation tool: the SVO Slider Method.
18
Design
The SVO Slider Method:
In order to empirically estimate social preferences I employ a relatively 
new measurement technique known as the SVO Slider Method (Murphy et al., 
2011). This is a form of decomposed game that consists of six primary items 
designed to measure SVO over a high resolution spectrum, rather than 
categorically. This method produces a continuous variable in the form of an SVO 
index score that captures social preferences ranging from relatively proself 
orientations (competitive & individualistic) to relatively prosocial (cooperative & 
altruistic). In addition, it contains nine optional secondary items designed to 
disentangle cooperative social preferences motivated by pure joint maximization 
versus inequality aversion. 
Besides being simple to administer and score, the SVO Slider Method 
offers several advantages over alternative decomposed game techniques like the 
Triple Dominance Scale and Ring Measure. Firstly, these methods rely heavily on
discrete categorical data. By lumping decision makers into a limited set of SVO 
types, a great deal of nuanced information about preferences on the margins of 
these categories is lost. The SVO Slider Method instead generates a continuous 
measure representing the relative weight people place one their payoffs and the 
payoffs of others. This score provides a ranked and transitive measure of social 
preferences over a continuum ranging anywhere between highly proself (perfectly
19
competitive) to highly prosocial (perfectly altruistic). While the index can also be 
evaluated categorically, this is largely for descriptive purposes or to allow 
straightforward comparisons with older methods. The real value of this variable is
that it is an efficient tool for regression analysis, and can be used to easily control 
for social preferences when analyzing other data.
Secondly, by utilizing the full 15 item version of the test, the SVO Slider 
can also be used to distinguish between individuals who identify as cooperative 
due to a social preference for ordinary joint maximization, or inequality 
minimization. Alternative methods have either ignored this dimension, or 
misinterpreted inequality aversion among cooperative subjects as decision 
inconsistency. This reduces the potential for biased measures of group 
composition, or over-representation of certain SVOs (namely proself orientations)
in the sample. 
The SVO Slider Method is conducted by randomly matching decision 
makers with another anonymous participant (identified only as the “other”) and 
presenting them with a sequential series of joint distribution items based on the 
traditional SVO Ring framework. However, unlike the Ring Measure or Triple 
Dominance Scale which present a fixed number of binary or multiple choice items
respectively, the SVO Slider displays an intuitive continuum of joint payoffs 
using a quasi-continuous sliding scale. For example, consider a joint distribution 
item that ranges between two pre-defined endpoints, πA and πB inclusively. 
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The decision maker selects their preferred payoff, πi anywhere between this 
range, and automatically assigns the other participant π j=(πA+ πB)−π i . The 
user sees the values assigned to themselves and the recipient updated in real time, 
and after a check for comprehension, confirms their decision for each item. The 
ranges defining the six primary and nine secondary items are shown in Figure 2 
(Murphy & Ackermann, 2014, p. 32).
For the six primary items, the endpoints that define each range correspond 
to cardinal points along the SVO ring connecting perfectly altruistic, cooperative, 
individualistic, and competitive joint distributions. Rather than forcing a decision 
21
Figure 2: Primary & Secondary SVO Slider Items
maker to choose between options representing one set of endpoints or the other, 
this allows them to express consistent preferences in between SVO categories as 
well as on them. This provides us with a continuous and more accurate 
description of their ranked social preferences, with an added check for transitivity 
(for example if altruism if preferred to cooperation, and cooperation is preferred 
to individualism, then altruism must be preferred to individualism).
The nine secondary items are designed to distinguish between cooperative 
preferences motivated by pure joint maximization, and joint maximization 
conditioned on minimizing the level of of inequality between payoffs. The 
endpoints for these items are defined such that each one crosses a 45 degree line 
corresponding to perfectly equal joint distributions. Decisions made on or near the
line indicate cooperation conditioned on limiting inequality (inequality aversion), 
while those on or near the endpoints indicate ordinary joint maximizing 
cooperation (inequality tolerance).
The SVO index score is calculated from the six primary items by first 
finding the ratio of average self and average other payoffs, shifted left to the 
middle of the SVO ring by subtracting 50 units. Taking the arctan of this variable 
produces the final index score in degree units shown by Equation 1. 
SVO=arctan (
π̄ j−50
π̄i−50
)
 
(1)
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This generates a continuous and transitive measure of social preferences ranging 
from relatively proself preferences to relatively prosocial. The higher (lower) the 
index score, the more prosocial (proself) the decision maker's SVO.
Based on the index scores associated with perfectly consistent preferences 
for each of the four idealized SVOs, categorical ranges for each orientation can 
also be defined. On the proself half of the spectrum, an SVO index less than 
-12.04 degrees indicates relatively competitive distributional preferences, while 
scores between -12.04 and 22.45 degrees indicates relatively individualistic. On 
the prosocial side, scores between 22.45 and 57.15 degrees indicates relatively 
cooperative distributional preferences, while a score above 57.15 degrees 
indicates relatively altruistic. The threshold values for each cardinal SVO 
category are more or less arbitrary, and need only be applied when discrete 
categorization is unavoidable (Murphy et al., 2011, p. 780).2
Based on the nine secondary items we can also distinguish between 
cooperative subjects who favor pure joint maximization (with no concern for 
equity) and those who pursue conditional joint maximization (contingent on 
avoiding increase in inequality). Dividing each cooperative subject's average 
normalized distance from distributions corresponding to perfect equality, D̄equality ,
2  Because these four categories are not symmetrically distributed around the entire SVO Ring, 
index scores do not correspond exactly to the degrees shown on the the ring. Perfectly altruistic
decisions for example, yield an SVO index of 61.39 degrees rather than 90 degrees. This 
results in the somewhat unintuitive threshold values defined above, however it does not 
adversely effect the measure's statistical power or validity (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014, p. 
33).
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by the sum of this value and the average distance from distributions 
corresponding to perfect joint maximization, D̄ joint , produces a zero to one 
inequality aversion index given by Equation 2. (Crosetto et al., 2012, p. 5).
IA=
D̄equality
(D̄equality+ D̄ joint)
 (2)
An index value equal to zero indicates perfect inequality aversion. Conversely, a 
score equal to one represents a pure joint maximization preference, with no 
concern for changes in inequality (perfect inequality tolerance). 
Common-Pool Resource Game:
The CPR dilemma component of the experiment is simulated in the 
tradition of Ostrom et al. (1994), and Van Soest & Vyrastekova (2006). This 
model was chosen to allow relatively straightforward comparisons to earlier 
experimental CPR studies. Consider a simple, static t=1 , . .. ,T  round resource 
game. A rivalrous and non-excludable hypothetical resource is shared by n≥1  
resource users. In each round every individual user i=1 ,. . . , n  is endowed with a
fixed quantity of effort, e≥1 .  The user can allocate their efforts between two 
revenue generating activities. The first is resource extraction, where x i ,t  equals 
the amount of effort individual i devotes to extraction in round t. Group extraction
effort is the sum of all individual efforts, X t=∑ x i ,t . The marginal costs of 
extraction, v , are assumed constant for simplicity. Group extraction revenues in 
round t are a function of total group extraction efforts, with a quadratic revenue 
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function of the form, Rt( X t )=α X t−β X t
2 . The individual user's share of group 
extraction revenue is proportional to their share of total extraction effort. Thus the
individual extraction revenue of user i in round t is given by,
r i , t=( x i , t / X t )(α X t−β X t
2) .
The second activity in which a user can invest their efforts is assumed to 
be a non-resource related option that pays a fixed return, w , per unit of effort. 
Non-extraction effort is simply the total effort endowment minus the effort 
allocated to resource extraction. The user's revenue from this activity equals the 
fixed rate of return multiplied by the amount of non-extraction effort,
l i , t=w(e−x i , t) . The final profits of user i in an unregulated round t is 
summarized by Equation 3.
π i , t( x i , t , X t )=w (e− xi ,t )+( xi ,t /X t )(α X t−β X t
2)−v xi ,t  (3)
The level of extraction effort is considered socially optimal when it 
maximizes the joint payoffs of the entire n-user group. The symmetrical, 
cooperative level of extraction effort is equal to x i ,t
* =(α−w−v ) /2 β n .  In a non-
cooperative setting individuals seek to increase their own payoffs by exerting 
more extraction effort than is consistent with the social optimum. The 
symmetrical, Nash Equilibrium level of individual extraction effort is equal to
x i ,t
N =(α−w−v ) /[ β (n+1) ] . In both cases cases (α−w−v )>0 . Cooperative and
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competitive group extraction is simply X t
*=∑ x i , t* , and X tN=∑ xi ,tN , 
respectively. Note that a single user case where n=1 , implies that x i ,t
* =x i , t
N  (i.e. 
the Nash and optimal levels of extraction effort are identical). Given only one 
user, there are no competitive pressures to increase extraction effort beyond what 
is already efficient. However, when the number of users increases such that, n>1 ,
so to does the Nash level of extraction effort until x i ,t
* < xi ,t
N . When the Nash level 
exceeds the social optimum a CPR dilemma occurs and Hardin's Tragedy of the 
Commons holds. This represents the unregulated, baseline stage of the CPR 
experiment that will form the within subjects control group.
To test the effect that peer-enforced regulation has on the CPR dilemma, 
the model can be extended to incorporate an endogenous enforcement 
mechanism. Suppose that in regulated treatment rounds each user is also endowed
with a fixed amount of enforcement tokens, s≥0 , after the initial extraction 
effort decisions have been made and revealed. These tokens can be held for a 
fixed return per unit kept (assumed to unity) or sent to other users to affect their 
final earnings. Each token sent changes the recipient’s earnings by some impact 
ratio, p . Let the number of enforcement tokens sent to user j (where j ≠ i) by 
user i in round t equal γ j i ,t≤s  and the number of enforcement tokens user i 
receives from user j equal to λi j , t . The final profits of user i in an enforcement 
round t would then be given by Equation 4.
26
̂π i , t=π i , t+s−∑ γ j i , t+ p∑ λi j , t  (4)
Profits in a regulated peer-enforcement round thus equals the user's initial 
unregulated profits, plus their unsent enforcement token endowment, minus the 
sum of tokens sent to other users, plus the sum of tokens received multiplied by 
the impact ratio. When p<0 , the tokens received represent a sanction that 
reduces the user's net payoff. All parameters and their associated values are 
summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Experiment Parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Extraction revenue function parameter 11.5
β Extraction revenue function parameter 0.15
w Non-extraction revenue per unit effort 1
c Marginal extraction cost 1.5
n Number of participants per group 5
T Number of rounds per stage 10
e Effort endowment 10
s Sanction token endowment 6
p Impact ratio -2
x i , t
* Socially optimal user extraction 6
x i , t
N Nash equilibrium user extraction 10
X t
* Socially optimal group extraction 30
x t
N Nash equilibrium group extraction 50
Marginal cost and revenue function values were chosen to ensure 
extraction payoffs in the control stage  would be non-negative, and also so total 
earnings would be sufficient to compensate subjects from each campus sampled 
for the opportunity cost of their time. In the event that sanctions received in an 
enforcement round exceeded extraction earnings such that ̂π i , t<0 , final profits 
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were rounded up to zero to ensure subjects could not incur losses by participating 
in the experiment.
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Experiment
Procedure:
Experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks (UAF) and the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA) in March and 
April during the Spring 2014 semester. Participants consisted primarily of 
undergraduate students of business and economics. Fairbanks area subjects were 
recruited directly from UAF undergraduate classes in economics and business, 
while those in Anchorage were recruited from an email database maintained by 
the UAA Experimental Economics Lab. All subjects were paid for their 
participation, receiving a lump sum show-up award, plus any game earnings. 
Ten experimental sessions were conducted in total, involving between five
and fifteen participants at a time (results were not sensitive to the number of 
simultaneous participants). Four sessions involving 25 subjects were conducted at
the University of Alaska Fairbanks, followed by six sessions at the University of 
Alaska Anchorage involving an additional 60.3 Session length averaged 
approximately 90 minutes. Sample statistics for each campus are provided in 
Table 3.
3 Due to technical problems, one session conducted at UAF was dismissed shortly after the start 
of the experiment. Five participants were given the opportunity to return and reattempt the 
experiment one week later. Results from this session were isolated and compared to other 
groups to test for contamination arising from the gap in completion. No statistically significant 
deviations in decisions or behavior were detected. Because its omission does not significantly 
alter any results or conclusions, the decision was made to retain this data in the analysis. 
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Table 3: Sample Statistics
Campus UAF UAA
Sample Size N=25 N=60
Mean Age 21.3 (SD=3.6) 28.2 (SD=12.5)
Mean Years of Education 13.8 (SD=2.1) 14.5 (SD=3.0)
Percent Male 60.00% 59.30%
Show-Up Award $10.00 $5.00
Mean Game Earnings $15.92 (SD=3.10) $16.98 (SD=1.18)
All experiments were administered digitally, and programed using the 
Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (Z-Tree) (Fischbacher, 
2007) (see Supplemental File 1 for code). After being checked in and completing 
the requisite informed consent paperwork (see Supplemental File 2), subjects 
were randomly assigned to private computer terminals and provided with 
instructions (see Supplemental File 3). Participants were informed that they would
be playing a series of paid decision games with others attending that day, and that 
their game earnings would depend not only on their decisions, but also on the 
decisions of their peers. Experimental currency units were framed as “points”, 
with a point to dollar exchange rate of $0.02. Communication between 
participants was not permitted.
The experiment itself was divided into three stages. Instructions were 
delivered verbally at the start of each stage, with a break for questions in between.
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In the first stage subjects played an “Anonymous Distribution Game” consisting 
of the full 15 item version of the SVO Slider test. This stage was programmed 
using customized code originally developed by Crosetto et al. (2012). Items were 
shuffled and displayed in the same order for each subject. After all choices were 
recorded, one randomly selected item was selected for payment. The subject 
received however many points they assigned to themselves, and their partner 
received the points assigned to them.
Stage two consisted of an unregulated CPR game played in groups of five. 
All decisions were made independently and simultaneously. Group members were
identified only by a randomly shuffled Subject ID Label to prevent decisions from
being connected between rounds. The game was framed as a decision about how 
many units of a hypothetical natural resource to extract from a stock shared 
among the group. In order to simplify the decision process subjects were only 
required to choose their level of extraction effort in each round, which was framed
by the number of resource units extracted (a whole number between 1 and e=10, 
referred to as “my extraction”). They were told their earnings in each round would
depend on how many units they decided to extract and how much the whole group
(them included) extracted in total (referred to as “everyone's extraction”). 
Participants were provided with a table summarizing all combinations of 
personal and group extraction decisions, and the associated point payoffs (see 
Supplemental File 4). In addition they were also asked to provide their best guess 
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at what they expected group extraction would be in each round. After a thorough 
demonstration of how the table was interpreted, two unpaid practice rounds were 
played, followed by another opportunity for questions, and finally ten paid 
rounds. After everyone in the group made their individual extraction effort 
decisions and their best estimate of the group's total extraction effort, they were 
shown a screen summarizing the results of that round. Their unregulated 
extraction payoffs were automatically calculated and displayed for them. In 
addition, they were able to see information on the extraction levels and earnings 
of each member of their group, as well as in total. 
The third stage consisted of a peer-regulated CPR game with an 
endogenous sanctioning mechanism. The procedure was similar to the previous 
stage, played for the same number of rounds, and with the same number of group 
members.4 Subjects made their extraction decisions and estimates of group 
extraction just as before. However, in this stage after extraction earnings had been
calculated and displayed, each subject was endowed with six enforcement 
(sanction) tokens. Subjects were told that these tokens could be used to add one 
point per token to their extraction earnings, or given to other group members to 
reduce the recipients extraction earnings by two points per token. After deciding 
how many tokens they wished to keep or send to other users, each subject's final 
regulated payoffs were calculated and displayed for them to see. 
4 Group assignment was constant between stages, with the exception of one session where 
subjects were randomly re-shuffled following a power failure between stage two and three.
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Hypotheses:
The Hardinian assumption that decision makers in CPR dilemmas can be 
universally described as rational and self-interested (i.e. perfectly individualistic) 
has traditionally been taken for granted in the social sciences. However this may 
or may not be a realistic description of social preferences for all decision makers. 
We routinely observe deviations from pure individualism in other forms of social 
dilemma where subjects may voluntarily contribute to public goods or abstain 
from defection in prisoner's dilemmas despite no seemingly self-interested 
incentive to do so. A more reasonable model of human behavior should 
incorporate the possibility of other forms of social preference, whether they be 
prosocial concerns for altruism, cooperation, or inequality aversion, or even other 
proself motivations like competition. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect that participants in the subject pool may possess a diverse range of social 
preferences. This leads to Hypothesis One: the subject pool should display 
heterogeneity in the distribution of their social preferences, which may range 
anywhere from relatively proself orientations like competition and individualism, 
to relatively prosocial orientations like cooperation and altruism.
If we assume that proself subjects are concerned primarily with the 
maximization of their own relative or absolute payoffs, then we would expect 
these users to also display higher overall rates of extraction effort near Nash 
equilibrium levels in an unregulated CPR dilemma. Conversely if prosocial 
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motivations of cooperation or altruism dominate, we would expect these users to 
display lower levels of extraction effort, closer to socially optimal levels. This 
brings us to Hypothesis Two: if intrinsic social preferences captured by a subject's
SVO index carry over to strategic games, this score should be inversely related to 
unregulated extraction levels. In other words, subjects identifying as more 
prosocial (proself) should have lower (higher) rates of resource harvest, all else 
equal.
Lastly, because sanctioning is costly in the regulated treatment stage (each 
sanction token used costs the user one point) individualistic users should have no 
incentive to participate in a peer-enforced regulatory institution. Given the finite 
number of rounds, backwards induction suggests individualists should abstain 
from sanctioning and simply use their token endowment to increase their own 
earnings. Similarly, altruistic users should not engage in sanctioning because 
doing so is assured to reduce aggregate earnings. 
Cooperative subjects may be willing to engage in enforcement, punishing 
those who extract more than the optimal level. However they must also consider 
the possibility that doing so may reduce joint earnings or increase inequality 
between individual payoffs. Sanction use among cooperative subjects is thus 
indeterminate. Competitive decision makers should be willing to use sanction 
tokens against all subjects in order to increase their payoffs relative to others in 
their group. 
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Because the predicted enforcement strategies tend to differ based on 
discrete SVO categories, Hypothesis Three is less clear-cut: individualistic and 
altruistic subjects should generally not participate in sanctioning during the 
regulated CPR stage, while cooperative and competitive users might. Competitive
users should sanction those whose earnings exceed their own, while cooperative 
users may or may not sanction those whose extraction exceeds the social 
optimum.
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Results
Social Value Orientation Experiment:
SVO scores for all 85 subjects were successfully estimated in stage one of 
the experiment using the SVO Slider Method. As discussed earlier, one of the 
main advantages of this technique is that it does not simply rely on a limited set of
discrete SVO categories into which subjects must be lumped. Instead it produces  
a ranked and transitive measure of social preferences over a continuous spectrum 
of proself and prosocial orientations. In additional to being useful for regression 
analysis, this measure also allows us to plot a frequency histogram to see how 
SVOs are distributed among the sample. This distribution, with a bin size of five 
degrees is provided in Figure 3.
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Moving from relatively proself preferences on the left hand side, to 
relatively prosocial on the right, there is clearly significant variation in how 
subjects value their own outcomes relative to others. Estimating a LOWESS 
smoothed kernel density function (Cleveland & Devlin, 1988) suggests a bimodal 
distribution (bandwidth = 0.5). The majority of the subject pool is clustered on the
right, skewing the larger distribution towards the relatively prosocial 
(cooperative) end of the SVO spectrum. The smaller distribution skews left 
towards the proself (individualistic) end, clustering around the mode observation. 
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Figure 3: SVO Distribution
The function gradually tails off to the left, indicating relatively weak preferences 
on the more extreme end of the proself spectrum. These results largely mirror 
prior estimates of group composition using the SVO Slider Method on university-
recruited subject pools (Murphy et al., 2011, p. 776).
Although SVO is best conceptualized as a continuous construct, traditional
categorical analysis is also possible. Using the original threshold values 
established earlier, all 85 subjects can be classified by their predominant SVO 
type. While it should be noted again that the dividing lines between categories are 
more or less arbitrary (based largely on proximity to the nearest idealized 
preference), this information can still be useful for descriptive purposes, or to 
allow straightforward comparison to studies using alternative SVO measurement 
methods. 
42.4% of the subject pool (N=36) can be categorized as consistently 
displaying individualistic behavior, i.e. behavior that largely conforms with self-
interested profit maximization, and disregard for the payoffs of others. The mean 
SVO index within this range is equal to 7.95 degrees (SD=7.33). There is little 
variation in this category, with the majority of subjects concentrated around the 
mode SVO index of 7.82 degrees, which corresponds to perfect individualism. Of 
the 36 subjects who were classified as individualistic, 58.3% of those (N=21) 
displayed perfectly individualistic preferences, indicating that most participants in
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this range preferred joint distributions that maximized their own payoffs, 
regardless of how it impacted the payoffs of others. 
The remaining 57.6% of the subject pool (N=49) can be categorized as 
consistently displaying cooperative behavior, i.e. behavior that largely conforms 
to joint profit maximization, and sensitivity to the payoffs of others. The mean 
SVO index within the prosocial range is equal to 32.61 degrees (SD=6.25). It is 
interesting to note that there is significantly more spread within this category 
relative to the individualistic range. This suggests that there may be wider variety 
of consistent prosocial orientations relative to the more proself side of the 
spectrum, an interesting nuance that would be overlooked by employing a simple 
discrete SVO measurement method.
Results from the secondary items allow us to extend the analysis of 
cooperative SVOs by distinguishing between subjects with pure joint maximizing 
preferences (but with no regard for the level of inequality between payoffs) and 
preferences that condition joint maximization on an equitable distribution of 
payoffs. The inequality aversion index scores for the 49 subjects that identified as 
cooperative are summarized in Figure 4, with a bin size of 0.1.
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Although there is heterogeneity in how prosocial subjects regard equity, 
the sample skews significantly towards the left-hand, inequality averse side of the 
spectrum. Dividing the index down the middle, and classifying subjects with an 
index score less than 0.5 as inequality averse, and those above 0.5 as inequality 
tolerant, suggests that the vast majority of cooperative subjects (96.0%) share a 
distaste for inequality and tend to conditionally maximize joint payoffs when 
doing so does not substantially reduce equality. Again, this is an interesting 
nuance in social preference, that would otherwise be ignored using older methods.
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Figure 4: Inequality Aversion Index
Finally, while there were several subjects with SVO scores near the 
threshold values for competitive and altruistic preferences, no one in the sample 
identified strongly enough with either orientation to be discreetly classified in 
these ranges. This finding is not particularly unusual given the non-randomly 
selected nature of the subject pool. The inherent selection bias associated with 
subject recruitment is a likely factor. We would not expect many people, 
especially college students, to volunteer for a paid social experiment only to 
arrive with a desire to largely give their earnings away to other participants 
(altruism). College campuses also tend to filter out overt anti-social behavior, 
therefore finding few subjects willing to sabotage others simply to increase their 
relative payoffs (competition) is not unusual either. 
While the subject pool is not intended to be representative of the general 
population, it nonetheless provides some interesting insights into the composition 
and distribution of SVOs. Although social preferences are limited to just two of 
the available categories from the SVO Ring, preferences within these ranges are 
not homogenous. There is significant variation among cooperative subjects 
especially. It is also clear that SVOs are not uniform with respect to 
individualism. While perfect individualism is the most commonly occurring 
observation, relative to the entire sample it is in fact a minority preference, 
applying to only 24.7% of the 85 person subject pool. These nuances in social 
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preferences would be largely overlooked by employing estimation techniques 
such as the Triple Dominance or Ring Measures.
The results of the SVO Slider experiment can be summarized with the 
following observations. Firstly, there is significant heterogeneity in the intrinsic 
motivations that drive resource allocation decisions. Only about one fourth of the 
total sample conforms to the perfectly individualistic social preferences 
commonly assumed by traditional rational choice theory. This confirms 
hypothesis one and suggests that blanket behavioral assumptions which rule out 
other-regarding preferences may not be universally applicable. Secondly, most 
decision makers that display nominally cooperative behavior, condition joint 
maximization on limiting increases in inequality. This inequality aversion is often 
overlooked by alternative tests of social preference which either ignore or 
misinterpret concerns for equity. This finding should be of interest to researchers 
interested in how perceptions of fairness influence decision making in social 
dilemma contexts.
It is important to remember that the SVO Slider Method, like all 
decomposed games, precludes the possibility of strategic behavior. Therefore, by 
themselves, these observations tell us very little about how social preferences 
might manifest under the strategic conditions of an actual natural resource 
dilemma. In order to determine if the intrinsic social preferences captured by the 
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SVO Slider Method carry over to CPR dilemmas we turn to stages two and three 
of the experiment.
Common-Pool Resource Experiment
After information on each subject's SVO was collected in stage one, 
subjects were randomly placed into five-person groups (N=17). Each group 
played ten incentive compatible rounds of a simple unregulated CPR game (stage 
two). This was followed by an additional ten rounds of a peer-enforced, regulated 
CPR game in which participants were also given the option to use a sanctioning 
mechanism to punish other users (stage three). Rounds one through ten represent 
the control stage of the CPR experiment with no regulation, while rounds eleven 
through twenty represent the within-subjects treatment under the enforcement 
institution. The socially optimal level of group extraction that would maximize 
joint payoffs was equal to thirty units per round, while the Nash equilibrium 
extraction level was equal to fifty units. Mean group extraction levels across all 
twenty rounds of the two stages are summarized in Figure 5.
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Unregulated group extraction levels started well above the optimal level 
and trended upwards as the stage progressed. Average group extraction between 
rounds one through ten was equal to 42.0 units per round (SD=2.0). While 
extraction fell short of the predicted Nash extraction level, this was likely 
sensitive to the relatively short ten round length of the stage. Given enough 
rounds, unregulated extraction rates would likely continue to increase until the 
Nash level would be approximated. 
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Figure 5: Average Group Extraction
The results of the unregulated CPR game confirmed an inverse 
relationship between subject SVO and average unregulated extraction efforts. 
This finding held whether using the continuous SVO index measure, or discrete 
SVO categories, and also when comparing subject-level or group-level decisions. 
The relationship between individual SVO indexes and average user extraction in 
stage two is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Average Unregulated Extraction
Based on a multiple regression holding other subject specific factors 
(gender, age, education and campus) constant, a 10 degree increase (decrease) in 
SVO score towards a more prosocial (proself) orientation was associated with a 
0.5 unit decrease (increase) in average unregulated extraction efforts (p=0.000, 
R2=46.2%). Evaluated discretely using the two SVO categories available, 
cooperative subjects extracted 1.1 fewer units than individualists on average 
(p=0.000). This suggests that all else equal, relatively more (less) prosocial 
(proself) preferences successfully predict lower (higher) rates of unregulated 
resource extraction. 
The introduction of the sanctioning mechanism in round eleven led to a 
clear reduction in average group extraction efforts, with mean extraction falling to
35.5 units (SD=1.0), a statistically significant reduction of 6.5 units compared to 
stage two (p=0.000). This is consistent with prior research showing that peer-
enforced sanctioning mechanisms can be used to reduce extraction levels and 
increase gross resource efficiency (Ostrom et al. 1992). While the trend towards 
increased extraction over time persisted, the rate of acceleration was lower than in
the unregulated rounds. Average group sanction token usage over stage three is 
shown in Figure 7.
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On average, groups used 6.4 tokens (SD=1.2) per round. Sanctioning 
occurred most frequently in the early rounds of the stage and declined steadily 
over time, which may partially explain why regulated extraction levels continued 
to trend upwards (albeit at a slower rate) even after introducing the possibility of 
punishment. 
While SVO appears to be a good predictor of extraction effort in an 
unregulated CPR game (whether judged continuously using the SVO index, or 
categorically by SVO type), it was less reliable at predicting average sanctioning 
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Figure 7: Average Sanction Usage
behavior in stage three. Analysis is complicated by the fact that the expected 
enforcement strategies of users differ based mainly on categorical SVOs, and the 
fact that only two of these orientations (individualism and cooperation) are 
present in our sample. Therefore only certain components of hypothesis three can 
be evaluated.
Contrary to game theoretical predictions that individualists should abstain 
from enforcement activities, sanction token usage was observed among both 
individualistic and cooperative subjects. Even more interesting is that on average, 
individualistic subjects tended to send more sanction tokens then their cooperative
counterparts, although the difference between the two categories was not 
statistically significant (p=0.379). While there appeared to be an inverse 
relationship between the continuous SVO index measure and average sanction 
usage as well, it was also not significant (p=0.199). 
This result seems unusual given that individualistic subjects are 
traditionally expected to have no incentive to contribute to group regulation, and 
should thus have lower (not similar) rates of sanction use. However this deviation 
from conventional rationality is largely consistent with prior studies such as Van 
Soest & Vyrastekova (2006) who also find that average enforcement levels 
between SVO types do not differ significantly (pp. 131-133). One possible 
explanation is that despite the finite number of rounds, individualists nonetheless 
believe that investing their sanction tokens towards affecting the extraction 
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strategies of others will generate a higher return than simply holding them. This 
may be a learned behavior that develops over the course of the stage as evidenced 
by the fact that the relationship between SVO index and initial sanction use in the 
first round of stage three was positive and modestly significant (p= 0.074) as 
expected. 
This suggests that relatively prosocial users may signal their willingness to
sanction early in the initial rounds. Once the threat of punishment is established, 
the more individualistic subjects likely adjust their own extraction strategy 
accordingly and harvest at levels closer to optimal. Because this level of 
extraction is actually mutually beneficial, and results in higher private profits, 
individualists might internalize more cooperative tendencies by adopting a greater
willingness to engage in the enforcement activity themselves. This would explain 
why differences in sanctioning strategies correlate to the initial sanctioning round,
but not the stage on average. By incurring sanction costs early on, cooperative 
subjects appear to produce positive externalities, by inducing more prosocial 
behavior from subjects that previously adopted individualistic strategies absent 
the peer-regulation.
The best predictor of whether subjects received sanctions in a given round 
was, not unsurprisingly, their deviation from the average extraction level of the 
group, particularly when this deviation was positive (extraction was greater than 
the group average). This relationship is shown shown in Figure 8. 
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On average, subjects whose extraction effort exceed the group mean by 
10% saw a 7.6% increase in sanctions received from other group members based 
on a semi-elastic simple regression (p=0.000, R2=58.3%). Deviation from group 
norms in terms of average extraction was thus likely to be met with retaliation in 
the form of higher sanctions received.
The results of the CPR experiment can be summarized with the following 
observations. Firstly, while extraction levels in the unregulated stage do not reach 
Nash levels, they are well above the social optimum, and tend to increase over 
53
Figure 8: Sanctions Received
time. This suggests that the Tragedy of the Commons may be a reasonable starting
point for modeling long-run CPR dilemmas in the absence of any institutional 
constraints. However, institutions are not the only determinant of extraction 
decisions in the dilemma. Social preferences play an important role as well, with 
harvest levels of prosocial users falling significantly below their more proself 
counterparts. This implies that unregulated extraction in a CPR dilemma is 
sensitive not just to the rules of the game, but also the social preferences of 
resource users. Given a homogenous group composed entirely of individualistic 
(cooperative) users we would expect to see higher (lower) rates of resource 
extraction, resulting in outcomes that better approximate the Nash (socially 
optimal) equilibrium. It is possible that a homogenous user group composed 
entirely of highly cooperative subjects would be able to maintain better than 
rational harvest levels over repeated iterations, avoiding (or at the very least 
postponing) the descent into a Tragedy of the Commons.
While SVO is a good predictor of extraction decisions, it is less useful as a
predictor of participation under the peer-enforced regulatory institution, at least 
with respect to the round average. Sanction usage is observed among both 
individualistic and cooperative SVO types in statistically equal measure on 
average, which is unusual given game theoretical predictions that individualists 
should largely abstain from costly enforcement activities. Enforcement behavior 
may better explained by focusing on the initial rounds of the game, where 
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sanctioning is most concentrated. As soon as enforcement tokens are introduced, 
prosocial users do display significantly higher levels of sanction use, as theory 
predicts. Cooperative users appear to signal their willingness to punish users who 
deviate from the group's average extraction level early on. Once this threat is 
established, individualistic users respond by reducing their extraction levels, and 
becoming more willing to use sanction tokens themselves. This results in the 
behavioral differences between cooperative and individualistic users subsiding 
over time, as evidenced by statistically similar sanction use and harvest levels 
once averaged over the duration of the stage.
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Conclusion
The Tragedy of the Commons is a convenient metaphor, and probably a 
reasonable starting point for the analysis of pure CPR dilemmas. However its 
strict assumptions regarding the rational, self-interested social preferences of 
resource users are not entirely accurate. While many decision makers can be 
described as individualistic, economists should exercise caution in applying this 
SVO label to all resource users. Using simple experimental methods, this study 
finds that people also adopt a wide variety of other, more nuanced SVOs, 
including (but not limited to) strong preferences for other-regarding cooperation 
and inequality aversion. Even within nominally identical SVO categories there is 
still significant variation in how strongly people identify with a given behavioral 
type. While the subject pool may not be representative of the general population, 
it is interesting to note that only a minority of the sample conformed to the 
perfectly individualistic orientation predicted by standard rational choice theory. 
By employing a continuous measure of social preferences via the SVO 
Slider Method, my findings confirm that the intrinsic values people possess can 
reliably predict certain behaviors under strategic CPR games. I find that relatively
prosocial (cooperative) preferences are associated with significantly lower rates of
resource harvest relative to more proself ( individualistic) orientations, holding 
other subject specific factors constant. Similarly, groups with higher proportions 
of prosocial users extract less on average than groups composed principally of 
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proself users. This suggests that the efficient long-run use of natural resources 
depends not just on institutional regimes or lack thereof, but also on the social 
preferences and group composition of the users themselves. We may observe 
open-access CPRs appropriated by communities with higher proportions of 
prosocially oriented users to be used more efficiently than those where proself 
tendencies dominate. None of this would be terribly surprising to anyone but 
economists, who have historically expected that individualism will always crowd 
out other-regarding preferences in the absence of formal or informal institutional 
regulations (Bolle, 1980).
Social preferences can also be a useful predictor of participation in a peer-
enforced regulated CPR dilemma, although the relationship is less clear. While 
average sanction use is statistically identical between prosocial and proself 
subjects, initial sanction use is significantly and positively related to prosociality 
like one would expect. Cooperative subjects appear to signal their willingness to 
sanction early in the game, and individualists lower their harvest accordingly. 
Once it becomes apparent that closer to optimal rates of extraction can result in 
higher private payoffs, individualists may become more willing to participate in 
enforcement themselves, and sanction others whose extraction tends to stray from 
the group mean. This suggests that sanctioning by cooperative users creates 
positive externalities, by promoting more prosocial behavior among otherwise 
individualistic users. This institutional heterogeneity certainly warrants further 
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study, and could be better captured by future experiments designed to account for 
it explicitly.
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